

The Mother of All Rebellions: Iraq and the PLP

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At 10pm on 18 March 2003, 139 Labour MPs took part in the largest rebellion by Government backbenchers since the beginning of modern British party politics. In turn, that rebellion was breaking the record set the previous month, when 121 Labour MPs – many, though not all, the same ones – had voted in then record numbers against their whip. Both revolts easily broke all the previous modern records: the 110 Labour MPs who rebelled over agricultural rent reform in 1975, or the 95 who voted against the post-Dunblane firearms legislation.¹ To find larger revolts by Government MPs against their whip, you had to go back to the Corn Laws.²

What made this even more remarkable was that Labour MPs had throughout the preceding Parliament been described as excessively cohesive, excessively loyal, and were repeatedly accused of lacking backbone. Writing in the *New Statesman* the week after February's vote, the 'comedian' Mark Thomas said that he 'didn't realise there were 122 spines in the PLP'.³

What happened? How had a group of MPs routinely dismissed as cowardly and sycophantic managed to produce such whopping rebellions? The ostensible explanation, of course, was the Government's policy towards Iraq – and, in particular, the possibility of the UK taking part in any US-led invasion. As well as the largest marches seen on the streets of London, and a string of resignations from the Government, at one point it looked possible that a government with a nominal majority of over 160 would require the support of Opposition MPs to get its way in the House of Commons. There was even talk that the Prime Minister could be forced to resign over the issue if he did not get sufficient support from his MPs.

This paper examines Labour's backbench divisions over the issue.⁴ First, we examine the three significant rebellions prior to those in February and March 2003. Then, second, we examine the two main rebellions, that in February, and the most important one of all, that in March, on votes effectively authorising war. Third, we consider the reasons why the rebellions were as large as they were, before, fourth, discussing the factors that limited rebellion. The fifth section of the paper considers the factors that determined whether an MP stuck to or defied their party whip, and the sixth section looks at the consequences of the rebellion for the Government's relations with the PLP.

Foreplay

Ever since President Bush's 'axis of evil' speech in January 2002, there had been deep concern amongst backbench Labour MPs about the possibility of an invasion of Iraq, especially without a UN resolution specifically authorising an attack. The first public manifestation of this unhappiness came in March 2002, when 133

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Labour MPs signed Early Day Motion 927 in the name of Alice Mahon expressing 'deep unease... at the prospect that Her Majesty's Government might support United States military action against Iraq'.

Pressure from concerned backbenchers was then (at least partly) responsible for Parliament being recalled in September 2002 for a further debate on Iraq. Denied the opportunity to vote on a substantive motion opposing unilateral military action against Iraq, 56 Labour MPs (listed in Table 1) defied their whips on the motion for the adjournment.⁵ Although fewer than the 133 EDM signatories, this was the largest backbench Labour revolt of the first session of the Parliament.

But the real surprise was not how many rebels there were, but how few. Nearly all the speeches made by Labour backbenchers during the recall debate were extremely sceptical, cautious and tentative, opposing military action unless it was backed by a fresh UN mandate, and in some cases even then. Much was made in the media of the presence in the no lobby of some ex-Ministers (such as Tony Banks and Glenda Jackson), but the absentees were far more noticeable: Gerald Kaufman, Ann Clwyd, Donald Anderson, Chris Smith, Gavin Strang, Peter Kilfoyle, Doug Henderson, and Tony Lloyd – mostly ex-ministers, all senior members of the PLP – made critical speeches, but none voted against their whip.

After much diplomatic wrangling, on 8 November 2002 the United Nations Security Council unanimously agreed the now famous Resolution 1441, but the resolution was not sufficient to persuade many of the Government's critics. The former chair of the Parliamentary Labour Party, Clive Soley, warned the government that it faced what he called 'mega problems' with its backbench MPs if it went to war without an explicit UN authorisation – which 1441 was not – and the next evidence of these problems came in the first government backbench rebellion of the new session of Parliament, in late-November 2002. The Speaker, Michael Martin, had unusually selected a critical Liberal Democrat amendment to the Government's motion on Iraq rather than a supportive Conservative one. As Robin Cook noted in his diary, the 'result was to leave both Labour and Conservative whips in a state of equal consternation, but with the entirely democratic outcome that there was now a genuine choice for those rebels who wished to take it'.⁶ Thirty Labour MPs (listed in Table 1) supported the Lib Dem amendment, which would have required both a UN mandate for military action and a vote in the House of Commons on whether or not to go to war.⁷ In an attempt to placate Labour backbenchers, the Foreign Secretary indicated that any decision to take military action would be put to a substantive motion of the House of Commons – although not necessarily *before* military engagement, on the grounds that there might be circumstances where the safety of British forces required the element of surprise.

TABLE ONE ABOUT HERE

Early in the New Year, the Prime Minister spoke on the subject of Iraq at a private meeting of the Parliamentary Labour Party – a meeting that was said to be 'split down the middle' on the issue – and a week later (22 January), 44 Labour backbenchers (also listed in Table 1) used an adjournment debate on 'Defence in the World' to express their opposition to the Government's policy on Iraq.⁸

Worryingly for the Government, these first three Iraq revolts did not involve the same people. Five MPs rebelled in November who had not done so in September, and a further ten rebelled in January who had not done so in either November or September. As a result, although the largest single rebellion saw 56 MPs vote against their whip, the three revolts together involved a total of 71 different

Labour MPs. Most were not new to the House (just five of the 71, marked in italics in Table 1, were from the 2001 intake) and most were not rebelling against the Government for the first time. Although the 71 included several MPs not then seen as 'usual suspects' – such as David Drew or Linda Perham – just nine (marked in bold in Table 1) cast their first vote against the Government during these three rebellions. These 71 were to provide the core of the Government's future problems over Iraq.

But equally worrying for the Government, there were also plenty of MPs who had indicated opposition to the possibility of war but had not (yet) voted against it. In addition to Alice Mahon's EDM (above), 84 Labour MPs were among the 119 signatories to Douglas Hogg's later EDM, EDM 716, which insisted that British forces should not be used against Iraq unless all other policy options had been exhausted, and there was clear evidence that Iraq posed an imminent threat to peace, a substantive motion in the House of Commons authorising military action and a second UN resolution specifically authorising British military action. All but one of those who had rebelled over Iraq had also signed one of the two EDMs,⁹ but a total of 55 others had signed at least one of the EDMs without (yet) rebelling.¹⁰ In addition to those harbouring private doubts (including plenty of members of the Government), this brought the number of Labour MPs who had publicly protested about Iraq – by vote or signature – to 148, even before the record-breaking votes of February and March.¹¹

The main event

On Wednesday 26 February the Commons debated a Government motion backing UN efforts to disarm Saddam Hussein (but which did not even mention the possibility of war) together with an amendment moved by the former Culture Secretary, Chris Smith, arguing that the case for military action against Iraq was 'as yet unproven'. Smith had liaised closely with Douglas Hogg, the leading Conservative rebel over the wording of the amendment, and it was deliberately framed in such a way as to generate the maximum possible cross-party support, not just from those opposed to war outright, but also to those in the 'not yet camp'.¹²

With the possibility of war getting ever closer, the previous weekend the Government Chief Whip, Hilary Armstrong, had predicted to the Prime Minister that the rebellion over Smith's amendment could involve as many as 100 Labour MPs. Yet armed with the amendment, it had taken Peter Kilfoyle, a former whip and another of the leading rebels, just an hour to gather sixty signatures in support of it. By the Tuesday morning, the day before the vote, more than 116 Labour backbenchers had already signed the amendment.

Foreign Office ministers were deployed to the House of Commons in an effort to change minds. Mike O'Brien, the Minister of State, set himself up in Room W4, just off Westminster Hall, and paged doubters to ask if they 'would like a briefing' from the Foreign Office on any 'outstanding issues'. At 10am on the morning of the vote, the Foreign Secretary Jack Straw addressed a meeting of the PLP in Committee Room 14, at which Ann Clwyd argued that Saddam should be deposed on humanitarian grounds. At Prime Ministers' Question Time later that day, Blair made a deliberate point of saying that he wanted several more votes in the Commons on the issue of Iraq – that this would not be MPs' last chance to voice concerns – and afterwards he invited groups of wavering MPs into his Commons office in a further effort to change minds. But up until lunchtime on the day of the vote the Labour whips still expected 145 Labour MPs to back Smith's amendment.¹³

During the six-hour Commons debate, Chris Smith told the House that he was speaking against the Government with a heavy heart, but that: 'We must say here that now is not the time, that the case has yet to be fully made, and that war and all its consequences cannot be the present answer'.¹⁴ As the vote grew nearer, Fraser Kemp, a Labour whip, scribbled a note to the Chief Whip: '122 MPs against'.¹⁵ Kemp was spot-on. Smith's amendment was defeated by 393 votes to 199, a government majority of 194. A total of 122 Labour MPs backed the amendment – although one PPS, Andy Reed, voted in the Government lobby as well, in order to cast an abstention.¹⁶ The Government motion backing UN efforts to disarm Saddam Hussein was then carried by 434 votes to 124. Many of the Labour MPs who had voted for the amendment abstained on the substantive motion, with the number of Labour cross-voters falling to a still sizeable 60.

The 121 rebels (that is, excluding Andy Reed) comprised three distinct groups of MPs. First, there were those Labour MPs who had already voted against their whip over Iraq. Of the 71 who participated in one of the three precursor rebellions discussed above, all but two (97 per cent) voted against the Government in February 2003.¹⁷ The second group were those who had signed an anti-Iraq EDM but had not rebelled before. Of the 77 MPs who had signed an anti-Iraq EDM but didn't participate in the earlier rebellions, 36 (47 per cent) voted in support of Smith's amendment.¹⁸ The third – and numerically least significant group – were MPs who had neither rebelled nor signed an EDM on the issue: 16 such MPs participated in the rebellion. These three groups are listed in Table 2, with those who then went on to rebel against the main Government motion listed in bold. Just as with Smith's amendment, those who had previously rebelled over the issue proved most likely to rebel again: of the 60 MPs who voted against the Government's motion, 50 came from those who had rebelled against the Government over Iraq before February. Of the 121 rebels, 20 (in italics in Table 2) were casting their first dissenting vote against the Blair Government; none of these went on to vote against the Government motion.

TABLE TWO ABOUT HERE

After the vote, Chris Smith told reporters that the scale of the vote went 'beyond my wildest imaginings'.¹⁹ Only 119 Labour backbenchers (that is, the non-payroll vote) had voted with the Prime Minister, at least 48 doing so reluctantly, and a further 21 Labour backbenchers abstained.²⁰ Still, it could have been worse. The Prime Minister arrived so late for the 7pm vote that the doors of the lobby were already closing. One of his whips shoved Blair through, urging, 'Come ON, Prime Minister!' Blair just made it, avoiding even more embarrassment.²¹

There had been a gasp of disbelief in the Chamber when the result of the Labour amendment had been announced. Graham Allen, a leading critic of the Government over Iraq said that the vote was a 'heartfelt plea' from Parliament to Mr Blair to 'get off the treadmill to war',²² and he claimed that if the Government failed to change policy there would be worse to follow, which would make the rebellion seem like a 'tea-party'. Up to 20 Labour MPs who had abstained were reported as having told their whips that they were prepared to vote against the Government in any future vote authorising conflict.²³ A survey for *The Politics Show* asked all Labour's 264 backbenchers whether they would support the Government without a further Security Council Resolution. Of the 129 who responded, 17 said yes, 95 said no, and 17 said don't know. But crucially 16 of the 95 insistent upon a second resolution were new converts to the rebel camp. Doug Henderson, another leading rebel, predicted that upwards of 150 Labour MPs would rebel unless there was a new UN resolution explicitly authorising war. One newspaper report even suggested that Blair might face a rebellion of up to 200 Labour MPs and the resignation of 10 PPSs if he failed to secure a second UN

resolution.²⁴ Five Government PPSs – including Michael Jabez Foster, Anne Campbell, Tony Wright, and Andy Reed – were reported in the *Sunday Telegraph* as having threatened to resign if the UN did not back the British position. (Reed, who had abstained in the vote, then resigned the following day). As Foster, PPS to Lord Goldsmith, pointed out: 'There is a point where you have to decide whether this is right or wrong. This is about upholding the authority of the UN'.²⁵ Two other PPSs also openly wrestled with their consciences: David Kidney, a PPS at the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs said that he 'would have great difficulty in serving in the Government if there was no second resolution'; Chris Pond, PPS to Dawn Primarolo, the Treasury Minister, said that a lack of any second resolution would 'put a lot of us in a very difficult situation'.

The rebels received high level backing when Clare Short, the International Development Secretary claimed on *The Westminster Hour* on Sunday 9 March that the Prime Minister had been 'extraordinary reckless' with the future of the Government, and that unless UN authority was gained for military action, or for the reconstruction of Iraq, she would be voting against war. Two days later, at Prime Ministers' Questions, the Prime Minister promised to work 'flat out' for that much sought-after second UN resolution, but the following day (13 March) Robin Cook effectively told the Cabinet that he would resign if no second UN resolution was forthcoming.²⁶ The Leader of the House sounded even more intent on leaving the Government at Business Questions later that day, when he noted that 'collective responsibility applies to all those who are in Cabinet at the time of the debate' – the clear implication being that he would no longer be in Government.

On Wednesday, 12 March, more than 250 Labour MPs packed into Committee Room 14 to hear the Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw. The meeting was stuffed with Labour MPs in marginal seats who began warning of the need to back the Prime Minister. As one Labour loyalist put it: 'There are enough people in the Parliamentary Labour Party who recognise that they owe their seats to Tony as much as anyone else'.²⁷ Tam Dalyell sat shaking his head with rage, and then stormed out and when Diane Abbott spoke out against war, several backbenchers allegedly heard John Prescott say, 'Fucking shit, Fucking shit!' as he stood behind her.²⁸ With the prospect of a second resolution at the UN diminishing, the Prime Minister let it be known that he would resign if the vote went against him. Since he could rely on the votes of the Conservatives (who were largely, but not wholly, in support of the Government), this was extremely unlikely to happen. But to win the vote only because of the support of the Conservatives would have been extremely embarrassing and damaging. There was even talk – circulated as widely by his supporters as by his opponents – that the Prime Minister would resign if more Labour MPs voted against his position than for it.

As Blair flew off to the Azores for his 'war' summit with President Bush and Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar of Spain, one Cabinet minister gloomily predicted at least 30 resignations by junior ministers and ministerial aides.²⁹ On the eve of the substantive vote (17 March), Robin Cook resigned from the Government, claiming that he had been unable to support a war with 'neither international agreement nor domestic support', and accusing the British Government of 'a diplomatic miscalculation that will astonish history'.³⁰ When Cook sat down after giving his resignation speech in the House of Commons, he was given a standing ovation.

The Government's motion for the main Iraq debate on 18 March offered support to the troops in the Gulf, blamed the French for blocking moves to a new UN resolution, cited legal advice authorising war, and stated that the Government should 'use all means necessary' to disarm Saddam Hussein. Chris Smith's rebel amendment – again, a cross-party affair – argued that 'the case for war against

Iraq has not yet been established, especially given the absence of specific United Nations authorisation', but nonetheless pledged 'total support for the British forces engaged in the Middle East'.

Opening the debate, Blair argued that it was not the time for the international community to falter in the face of twelve years of non-compliance from Saddam Hussein, and in an effort to limit the revolt, he offered two assurances - that he would press President Bush to call for further progress to be made on the Middle East peace process (the 'road-map') and that humanitarian aid and a proper programme of reconstruction would be delivered to Iraq in the post-conflict period. After his speech, the Prime Minister did not repeat his mistake of the previous month (when he had been criticised for only staying in the Commons to listen to Jack Straw's opening speech, preferring to record a television programme instead),³¹ and stayed to listen to the debate in the Chamber for three hours. The debate, which lasted ten hours, then heard passionate pleas for and against military action. One of the leading rebels, Peter Kilfoyle focussed on what he termed 'the idiocy of fighting the wrong war, in the wrong place, against the wrong people'.

At 10pm, the rebel Labour amendment was defeated by 396 votes to 217, a Government majority of 179. The Government's motion endorsing military action was then passed decisively by 412 to 149. Some 139 Labour MPs backed the Labour rebel amendment (18 more than in February). Having tried and failed to carry an amendment to stop war, many of the Labour rebels then abstained on the Government motion, rather than being seen to oppose British troops about to go into battle - although 84 still voted against the Government's own motion.

By all accounts, it had been a traumatic day, especially on the Labour benches. Some Labour MPs broke down in tears in their offices after voting for the Government. Margaret Beckett wept behind the protection of the Speaker's Chair. Others drank heavily before summoning up the necessary resolve to drag themselves through the division lobbies. But it could have been much worse for the Government. There were 30 MPs (listed in Table 3) who voted for the anti-war amendment in March who had not done so in February. Eighteen of these MPs (marked in italics in the table) were casting their first votes against the Blair Government. Table 3 splits them into three groups. There are the two MPs who had rebelled over the issue prior to February - Bill Etherington and Michael Connarty - but who did not do so in February. Then, second, there were a further 11 MPs who had signed one of the anti-war EDMs but who did not rebel in February. And there were also 17 'new' rebels - including Robin Cook and John Denham, the Minister of State in the Home Office (marked down by many as future Cabinet material), who resigned from the Government on the morning of the vote. The Government lost one further minister - the Health Minister, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath - although John Prescott claimed not to know that Hunt was a member of the Government - along with six Parliamentary Private Secretaries.³²

TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE

If all those who had voted against the Government in February had stayed with the rebellion then the total revolt would have exceeded 150, making it perilously close to the point at which the Government would have required Conservative support to win the vote. They were saved from this fate by 12 Labour MPs who rebelled in February but who either switched to vote with the Government (four) or did not vote (eight) in March. They were: Anne Begg (although see below), Colin Challen, Jim Cunningham, Brian Donohoe, Jeff Ennis, Paul Farrelly, Khalid Mahmood, David Marshall, Chris Mole, Dennis Skinner (who was ill), Paul Stinchcombe, and Brian White. At least five PPSs - Russell Brown, Ivan

Henderson, Andy Love, Dennis Turner and Chris Pond - who had openly expressed grave reservations, ended up supporting the Government. And, despite her public agonising, Clare Short, the International Development Secretary, chose to stay in the Government – only to resign anyway two months later.

The full list of the 139 who rebelled in March's vote are given in Appendix 1. Those who also went on to vote against the Government's motion are in bold. They were joined by Anne Begg, who abstained over the amendment, but who voted against the Government's motion. As in February, the majority of those who went on to vote against the Government motion were those with 'form' from before February's revolt (accounting for 53 of the 84 rebels).

Why so large?

Pedants could lessen the scale of the revolts by pointing out that – large though it was in absolute term – as a percentage of the parliamentary party it was smaller than the 40 per cent of the PLP who defied the MacDonald Government in 1924 over unemployment benefit for strikers.³³ It was also smaller – though only marginally – than the 145 Labour MPs who voted against EC Membership in April 1975, although this was on a technically free vote (albeit against frontbench advice) and included eight members of the Cabinet.³⁴ But even the pedants had to admit that this was a remarkable rebellion – in absolute terms the largest against the whips since Corn Laws - and from a group of MPs routinely dismissed as cowardly and sycophantic.

Yet the first part of the explanation for the size of the Iraq rebellions is to reject any notion that Labour MPs were spineless – or somehow remarkably cohesive – during the 1997 Parliament.³⁵ This was simply a myth. A total of 133 Labour MPs – almost half Labour's backbenchers – rebelled during the 1997 Parliament, and there were plenty of large revolts. Moreover, what cohesion there was existed (in part) because the government was both able and willing to do deals with its backbenchers to head off discontent. Despite its reputation as an autocratic government, Labour since 1997 had proven adept at identifying potential difficult issues in advance and engaging in deals with the PLP to lessen the scale of any revolt.³⁶

Moreover, the PLP had become increasingly rebellious since 1997, and especially since 2001. The stunted, pre-election session of 2000-01 excepted, the number of backbench rebellions had been on the increase session-on-session since 1997, and the last full session before the Iraq votes – that of 2001-02 – was the most rebellious first session of any Labour government ever.³⁷ There were 76 separate revolts in that session alone, involving a total of 122 Labour MPs – exactly the same number as voted for the rebel amendment in February 2003. The PLP was therefore increasingly rebellious even before Iraq - and the rebellions over Iraq should therefore be seen as at least in part a symptom of that increasing rebelliousness, rather than its cause.

The second (and perhaps rather obvious) part of the explanation is the nature of the issue itself. There was genuine deep unhappiness about the possibility of military action on the backbenches of the PLP – for many of the same reasons that the majority of the country was unhappy. This included failing to understand the rationale or justification for war, the lack of any obvious exit strategy post-conflict, and a dislike and distrust of President Bush and US foreign policy. During Foreign Office Questions on 5 February 2002, Brian White, normally a Labour loyalist, asked the Foreign Secretary to be

... aware of the perception in many parts of the world that US foreign policy is based on double standards, because America is prepared to rip up the ABM Treaty [1972], reject the Kyoto agreement [on reducing the emission of greenhouse gases], ignore the World Trade Organisation ruling [on steel tariffs], blockade Cuba and so on. Is it not up to us as the closest ally of the US to make it aware of the dangers of that approach?³⁸

But the most important factor – and what made the rebellions so large – was the lack of any international support for the war – and most obviously, the lack of any fresh UN resolution explicitly sanctioning war. If military action had gone ahead *with* a fresh UN resolution, then there would still have been unhappiness amongst the PLP – they wouldn't have skipped through the division lobbies singing joyful songs as the bombs rained down on Baghdad – but any revolt would have been much lower and almost entirely composed of hard core critics of the Blair government. Although routinely mocked by the whips as 'peaceniks',³⁹ the number of pacifists on Labour's benches was relatively small. Previous rebellions against military action by the Blair Government had been relatively minor. Twenty-two Labour MPs had voted against military action against Iraq in February 1998, and just 11 forced a vote on the adjournment to protest against military involvement in Afghanistan in November 2001. It was not that the lack of a UN resolution alone that caused so much unease – because in April 1999 just 13 Labour MPs had voted against the bombing of Kosovo, which was similarly carried out without any UN authorisation. It was the serious doubts about the wisdom of the policy, *combined* with the lack of any widespread international support (with the lack of the UN mandate being the most obvious manifestation of the latter) that caused problems. Kosovo had at least been carried out by NATO, and for reasons that many in the PLP – including many on the left of the PLP – understood and supported.⁴⁰

Perhaps less obviously, the nature of the issue also made it very difficult for the government to enter into deals with its backbenchers. It was not possible for the government to use its normal tactic of negotiating the rebellion away, by offering concessions and amendments (as it had done frequently beforehand, and as it would be forced to do later in the Parliament over Foundation Hospitals and top-up fees). It was not possible to construct a 'third way' on the issue.

The third part of the explanation for the size of the revolt was the electoral and party politics of the issue. In parliamentary terms, because the (majority of) Conservatives were supporting the Government, it was possible for Labour MPs to vote against the Government without running the risk of defeating it, or bringing it down. By contrast, Labour MPs who voted for war would be entering the same division lobbies as the Conservatives – something that many of them dislike doing at the best of times. This helped increase the size of the rebellion and was one of the reasons that rumours began to spread that the Prime Minister might be forced to step down if the rebellion was too large. Because there was next to no chance that the Government would lose the vote, those around Blair needed to create a barrier to deter potential rebels.

There was also plenty of electoral and political pressure being placed on MPs to rebel, rather than to stick to the party line. Labour MPs were well aware of the way the issue was playing with the electorate. MPs did not report getting all that much post over the issue (although they went to inordinate lengths to deal with what they got) and some reported getting more complaints over asylum seekers than over Iraq.⁴¹ But the *type* of letters that Labour MPs were receiving caused some of them to worry. One normally loyal Labour MP's thinking on the issue was influenced when he received what he called letters from 'fair-minded people,

quite different from the usual anti-war letters', which argued that UN approval should be required before military action took place.⁴²

Of equal (if not greater) concern than pressure from the electorate was pressure from the selectorate. The threat of war coincided with Labour's MPs reselection meetings, the moment in every parliament when party members wield their most power. When Labour had entered Government in 1997 some in the party hierarchy had hoped that local constituency parties would help keep rebellious MPs in line. In fact, the opposite happened: with many local parties urging revolt rather than restraint on their MPs.⁴³ Several 'pro-war' MPs, including Oona King, Mike Gapes, Bridget Prentice, Jim Dowd, Barbara Roche and Martin Linton faced serious discussion of deselection. Even those MPs safe from deselection had reason to be worried. Few – especially those in marginal seats – could afford further to alienate those party workers who are needed to campaign at election time. The pressure was said to be especially intense on those MPs with large Muslim populations in their constituency. Joe Ashton, the former Labour MP, claimed that the size of the rebellion could be explained by the number of Labour MPs who had substantial numbers of Muslim voters – along with well-organised Muslim party members.⁴⁴ Roy Hattersley put the number of Labour backbenchers affected in this way as high as fifty.⁴⁵

Why not larger?

Yet for all that, it could still have been worse. More than 150 Labour MPs voted against the whip over the issue at one point or other. If they had all done so together, then the revolt would have been even larger than 139. There were a further 28 Labour MPs who signed one or more of the Iraq EDMs but who did not then go on to vote against the whip. If they had done so as well, then the rebellion would almost have reached 180. Add in those within Government and who considered but ultimately rejected resignation to join in the rebellion and the revolt could have hit the 200 mark.

Why did it not do so?

It is a truism (but still true) to say that the answer is because Labour MPs came under extreme pressure from their whips, from the leadership, and from their colleagues over the issue. MPs do not like defying their party line: the various ties of socialisation and party loyalty make it something to be avoided if at all possible.⁴⁶ One MP, no stranger to backbench rebellions, called it 'the hardest thing we do'.⁴⁷ And it can be made much harder still by the standard tricks of the whips: appeals to party loyalty, threats about future career prospects, and so on. To a great extent, there was nothing especially unusual about the *methods* involved in applying this pressure – although the involvement of the Prime Minister's wife in lobbying some MPs was novel.⁴⁸ What differed was the *intensity* of the pressure.

From the very first rebellion, it had been clear how intense the pressure placed on would-be rebels was going to be. As Labour MPs exited the rebel division lobby in September 2002, they found Government whips ostentatiously writing down their names. 'There was no need to do that', said one. 'You knew that the pressure was going to build after that'.⁴⁹ As always, the whips focussed their attentions on those thought to be 'wobbly' – even in the last few hours before March's vote there were still 50 MPs believed to be wobbly – and did not waste time on those known to be solid in their opposition.⁵⁰

The day before March's vote, for example, seven members of the Cabinet trawled the Commons tearoom. 'It was an extraordinary sight; ministers and whips

outnumbered backbenchers by two to one ...There was a lot of tea and jobs on offer', commented one leading rebel.⁵¹ Individual ministers were asked to act as a 'friend' to the rebels, and over the weekend telephoned many of the 121 Labour rebels from the February vote to try to persuade them into abstaining or voting against the amendment.⁵² Another 50 potential rebels were also contacted in this way. At a hastily arranged (and packed) meeting of the PLP on the Tuesday morning, Blair's 18-minute address met with 'thunderous applause', and seems to have rallied some of the doubters, including Hugh Bayley, a former minister, Mike Gapes and Barbara Follett, who indicated publicly that they had been swayed by the Prime Minister, while Gerald Kaufman weighed in with a strongly pro-Blair intervention.⁵³

Some Labour MPs had meetings with four Cabinet ministers in a day, and right up until the vote, the whips were feeding Labour MPs into meetings with the Foreign Secretary. Meanwhile, Tony Blair set up camp in the Commons tearoom (a rare event), seeing waverers in groups of between three and five. Blair was said to have argued 'reasonably', saying, 'Do you really think we can pull the troops out now? ... I need your support' and making it clear that the rebellion couldn't become too large: 'I don't want to win needing the Tories' support'. Some MPs remained unconvinced, but others were persuaded.⁵⁴ One MP – up till then adamant that he would vote against war – came out of a meeting with the Prime Minister having been persuaded to vote with the Government. 'Why did you do that?', asked another anti-war MP 'The Prime Minister pleaded with me', said the switcher. 'What was I supposed to do?' The anti-war MP replied: 'Tell him to fuck off'.⁵⁵

Three factors helped make this pressure effective, and thus limited the size of the revolt. First, for some MPs the issue became one of a vote of confidence in Blair's leadership. He used all the personal authority at his disposal to persuade the House of Commons of the rightness of his cause and behind-the-scenes, the Labour whips made it clear what could happen, arguing with recalcitrant backbenchers: 'Do you support regime change in Baghdad or Downing Street?' As Austin Mitchell recalled:

In the lobby Tommy MacAvoy [sic] grabbed me warmly by the throat and took me into the Whips' office where he gently explained that the media, not him I had to understand, were saying that Tony would step down if more Labour MPs voted against than for him... Did I want to be personally responsible for bringing down the most successful election winner Labour had ever had?⁵⁶

The Labour whips were helped in this by the actions of some of the Campaign Group, who began to talk openly of a change in the leadership of the party. On 24 February, Alice Mahon, a leading opponent of war, had declared: 'It's our party. Leaders come and go, but it's our party'; and on 11 March some Labour left-wingers tried to arrange a special conference to unseat Blair, arguing: 'It is time for the Prime Minister to consider his position. If he is not prepared to stand up to George Bush, he must make way for those that will'.⁵⁷ This represented a step too far for most Labour backbenchers, especially those who may have been anti-war but who remained pro-Blair.⁵⁸ At the PLP meeting on 12 March, a fellow left-winger Lynne Jones attacked Diane Abbott for her 'stupid tactical error' in trying to undermine Blair's leadership in this way,⁵⁹ and the Campaign Group's behaviour had the effect of dissuading some potential rebels. Tom Harris, an MP from the 2001 intake, said that he had come close to joining the rebels, 'But when I heard some of my colleagues talking about leadership challenges to Tony Blair, I thought this was ridiculous'.⁶⁰ As Peter Mandelson put it to one rebel: 'It's not about the war, it's about Tony'.⁶¹

Second, on 10 March the French inadvertently came to the Blair's aid when President Chirac indicated that France would vote against a fresh UN resolution, 'whatever the circumstances'.⁶² Jack Straw took Chirac's remarks to mean that the French were abandoning enforcement of UN resolution 1441, while Downing Street accused the French of 'poisoning' the diplomatic process.⁶³ Chirac's stance also gave the Labour whips (and the *Sun* newspaper, as well as its stablemate, *The Times*)⁶⁴ the opportunity to engage in a bout of French-bashing. Labour MPs could now be asked: 'Do you support Jacques Chirac or Tony Blair?' A number of MPs - one estimate puts the figure at 20 - were persuaded to stay in post and/or to support the Government in the lobbies due to what they regarded as the French use of an 'unreasonable veto'.⁶⁵ Among these MPs were one or two PPSs who had earlier said they might vote against the Government without a second UN resolution. Russell Brown, then the PPS to Lord Williams of Mostyn commented, 'The French are acting in a duplicitous manner and are playing their own game'. Another said: 'The motives of the French are not as pure as some of the other permanent members of the Security Council. I would stay in post if France vetoes the resolution'.⁶⁶ At the very least, Chirac's comments gave wavering Labour MPs an argument (however flimsy) with which to justify their support of the Government, as Mary Ann Sieghart explains:

This allowed the Prime Minister to portray himself as the one desperate to follow the UN route, while the French President acted as a wrecker. M Chirac's behaviour gave those MPs who had impaled themselves on a second resolution an excuse to get off the hook.⁶⁷

And third, the Government had effectively given the House of Commons the opportunity to decide whether British forces went to war. This had been one of the demands of those who had signed Douglas Hogg's EDM, as well as the EDM put forward by Dr Tony Wright. Although the formal prerogative power to declare war remained with the Crown, there had still been an important *de facto* change: had the vote gone against war, the Prime Minister would have resigned and British soldiers would not have gone into battle. The Government's decision to concede a vote on war - although largely a reflection of their weakness - did therefore have the effect of satisfying one of the basic demands of many Labour MPs: that the House of Commons should decide the matter. The Commons may not have taken its chance to stop war - but it was given it. Military action began 28 hours after the vote.

Who rebelled, who didn't

Yet for all that, some still did - and others didn't. Faced with similar arguments about the need to support 'Tony', or about the nasty French, some MPs defied all the pressure and voted against the party line and others did not.

This section of the paper is a first attempt - and, as will become clear, a fairly crude first attempt at that - to examine why some Labour backbenchers were persuaded, but others were not. It examines a range of 10 variables, designed to tap into a series of claims about the way MPs vote, and the factors that might persuade them. At heart, most of these are attempts to examine the extent to which self-interest will have affected MPs. For example, older MPs, or MPs with lengthy parliamentary experience, might be expected to be more resistant to pressures from the whips. Conversely, MPs who are newly-elected and/or young - and with the potential for future promotion up the ministerial ladder - might be more likely to stick to the party line. Similarly, MPs who are ex-members of the government - a more than 60-strong group by early-2003 - and whose careers

in government appear to be behind them similarly may have less to fear from defying the party whip.

We also examined two variables to tap into extra-parliamentary pressures: marginality and constituency ethnicity. From a theoretical perspective, it is never clear how marginality should affect British MPs. It is sometimes argued that MPs with marginal seats have more reason to be wary of the appearance of division, and thus are more keen on preserving unity and cohesion.⁶⁸ Yet, it could also be argued that – because most opinion polls showed a majority of the public against the war – MPs in marginal seats might have more reason to be responsive to the unhappiness with which the public viewed the possibility of going to war, and would want to signal to voters that they shared their concerns. Given the arguments about the importance of the Muslim vote, this could apply most strongly in seats with a high proportion of Muslim voters. We currently lack the data to check this, and so as a (pretty poor) surrogate we have used the percentage of non-white voters in a constituency.

Our third batch of variables test theories based on the identity of the MPs. Given the interest in the behaviour of women MPs – and the possible linkages between their sex and the substantive representation of women – we tested whether women MPs behaved differently to male MPs.⁶⁹ There were clear differences between the views of male and female voters over the Iraq war – with women being much more opposed to military action – and so we might expect these to be replicated within the House. Testing for the impact of the race/ethnicity of MPs is still problematic, because of the small numbers of non-white MPs – in exactly the way that empirical work on the behaviour of women MPs was hamstrung before 1997⁷⁰ – but we can at least test whether white and non-white MPs behave differently (and we also note, more specifically, the behaviour of the two Muslim Labour MPs). Following suggestions that the Welsh MPs had been especially rebellious, we also test for the nation in which MPs' constituencies were located.⁷¹

Lastly, we tested for the impact of an MP's previous rebelliousness and their opinions. Rebellious for the first time is a significant event for an MP – and one that makes them more likely to do so again. MPs who had been loyal before might therefore be expected to remain loyal to the party line. Those who had rebelled before might be expected to do so again. We measured MPs' opinions by looking at whether they had signed either of the two main anti-war EDMs.⁷² On one level this might appear to be a slightly tautological argument, with MPs who object to a policy publicly then being more likely to vote against it in the division lobbies. But it would at least be confirmation that EDMs are more than just meaningless pieces of parliamentary graffiti – as they are occasionally dismissed.

We start our analysis with an examination of those MPs who rebelled in at least one of the rebellions in February and March. We exclude from analysis any MP who was in Government throughout all of this period.⁷³ That gives us an N of 277 backbenchers, of whom 149 voted against the party at least once, and 128 who did not. We focus here solely on votes cast against the whip: one drawback of divisions in the Commons is that, unlike in some legislative chambers, abstentions cannot be formally recorded. The whips may formally sanction an absence from a vote, it may be accidental, or it may be deliberate. There is no information on the record that allows us to establish, at least not systematically, the cause of absences. We cannot therefore necessarily read anything into non-voting. For the purpose of systematic analysis, therefore, we have to rely on the votes cast.

Table 4 shows the results for the four non-categoric variables, most of which are distinctly unimpressive. There was almost no difference between the rebels and loyalists when it came to their parliamentary experience, marginality or the ethnicity of their seat. The only measure to see a significant difference was age: on average rebels were three years older than loyalists, a difference that was statistically significant (at $p < 0.05$).

TABLE FOUR ABOUT HERE

Analysis of the categoric variables (Table 5) was more revealing. There was a clear difference between the voting behaviour of male and female Labour MPs – although it was not in the direction expected. Whereas women voters were more hostile to war, amongst MPs it was the men who were most likely to vote against the party line and against war. Some 57 per cent of male Labour backbenchers rebelled, compared to just 40 per cent of the women, a difference that was statistically significant (at $p < 0.05$).

TABLE FIVE ABOUT HERE

There was no difference between the behaviour of white and non-white Labour MPs, although this was almost certainly because the latter category is too crude for sensible analysis of this issue: it was striking how both Muslim Labour MPs, Khalid Mahmood and Mohammed Sarwar, voted against the party line at least once. There was no statistically significant difference between the behaviour of ex-ministers and other MPs; indeed, if anything the ex-ministers (of whom 49 per cent rebelled) were slightly less likely to rebel than the rest (55 per cent). And although Welsh MPs were slightly more rebellious (62 per cent voted against the party line) than either English (53 per cent) or Scottish (55 per cent) backbenchers, the differences were not statistically significant.

There were, however, huge differences in behaviour when we came to look at both past behaviour and EDM signatories. Of those Labour MPs who had voted against the party line before (over any issue), 77 per cent also rebelled over Iraq. But of those MPs who had not rebelled before, just 29 rebelled over Iraq. Similarly huge differences came with the signatories of the EDMs. Of those who signed either of the anti-war EDMs, 81 per cent rebelled. Of those who hadn't, just 24 per cent rebelled. Both of these differences are – not surprisingly – statistically significant (at the $p < 0.000$ level).

Appendix two repeats this analysis for both the largest February rebellion, with Appendix three doing so for the March vote, to identify any differences that might exist between behaviour in the different votes. In general, there are few differences, although in February's vote, there was a statistically significant difference based on the ethnicity of the electorate (those who rebelled sat for constituencies with an average of nine per cent non-white voters, compared to six per cent for the loyalists, $p < 0.05$). At the same time, February's vote does not show any statistically significant differences between the behaviour of male and female MPs (although the women were still less likely to have rebelled than the men). March's vote, however, shows exactly the same findings were present above. There do appear, therefore, to be slightly different factors explaining rebellion in the two votes: those determining rebellion in the March vote are similar to the overall findings, but with slightly different factors driving revolt in February's rebellion.

Table 6 presents a simple logistic regression for participation in the Iraq rebellions. The dependent variable is voted against party line over Iraq (1)/did not (0). The independent variables are: age (in years), parliamentary experience

(in years), race (1 non-white, 0 white), sex (1 female, 0 male), percentage majority, percentage non-white electorate, nation (1 England, 0 Wales), career status (1 ex-minister, 0 other), and previous rebelliousness (1 rebelled before, 0 not rebelled before). In a second model, we then add in EDM signatory (1 yes, 0 no). Because of a problem with the data (discovered painfully late on in the process), we lack data on the percentage ethnicity of the Scottish seats, and so all Scottish MPs have been excluded from the analysis.⁷⁴

TABLE SIX ABOUT HERE

Overall, the results are quite impressive. The R^2 is 0.37, which isn't trivial, and the model correctly predicts 76 per cent of the MPs' behaviour. Even controlling for other variables, most of the variables have the effect expected: older MPs were more likely to rebel, as were non-white MPs, those with large populations of ethnic minority voters, those in Wales, and – most obviously – those who have rebelled before. Women were less likely to rebel, and the percentage majority has an almost negligible effect one way or the other. Two variables had a different effect here than when examining the bivariate data. Once we controlled for other factors, ex-ministers appear to be more likely to rebel (which is what we would have first expected, but not what the bivariate data showed). Perhaps more surprising, parliamentary experience appears to have exactly the opposite effect once we control for other variables, either than we would have expected *a priori* or than the bivariate data revealed. The less parliamentary experience an MP had, the more likely he or she was to vote against the party over Iraq. What makes this finding even more curious is that it is the only one, other than previous rebellion, to be statistically significant in the regression.⁷⁵

In the second model, we introduce the EDM signatory variable. This improves the overall explanatory power of the model considerably, with the R^2 rising to 0.59, and the percentage correctly predicted reaching 82 per cent. Most of the variables continue to work in the same direction as in model one (although age now has the opposite effect), although sex becomes significant and experience ceases to have any significant effect. As above, we repeat this exercise separately, for both the February and March votes in Appendices 2 and 3. The results are largely the same, although (as we would expect from the bivariate results) there are some differences. The percentage of non-white voters in a constituency was statistically significant in February's vote (with those MPs with more non-white voters being more likely to rebel) but not in March, whilst the influence of parliamentary experience (in the slightly counter-intuitive way identified above) was statistically significant in March but not February.

However, we have concerns about the inclusion of the EDM signatory variable, given that the relationship between this independent variable and the dependent variable is so strong. Therefore, we also looked separately at those 147 MPs who signed one or more of the two anti-war EDMs. The majority (117) went on to vote against the Government at least once, but a 30-strong minority did not. Given that all these MPs objected to the conflict – and strongly enough to be prepared to do so publicly – why did some rebel and others did not?

Table 7 shows three statistically significant differences (at the $p < 0.05$ level) between the non-categorical variables and rebellion. Those MPs who went on to rebel were older: the rebels were three years older than the loyalists. They were also more experienced: those who signed the EDM but then did not rebel had an average of seven years' experience in the Commons, compared to an average of 11 years for those who rebelled. And those who rebelled sat for safer seats, by an average of eight percentage points.

TABLE SEVEN ABOUT HERE

Table 8 – which shows the categorical variables – also shows some statistically significant differences. As we might have expected from the earlier analysis, nation, race, and career status do not show any statistically significant differences between the rebels and the loyalists. But sex/gender does - 84 per cent of the men who signed the EDM rebelled, compared to just 64 per cent of the women (a difference that is statistically significant at $p < 0.05$) – as, not surprisingly, does previous rebellion: of those EDM signatories with rebellious 'form', 90 per cent went on to vote against the Government, compared to 28 per cent of those who had yet to vote against the Government.

TABLE EIGHT ABOUT HERE

Table 9 shows the results of a logistic regression similar to that in Table 6, except that it is performed solely on those who signed the EDMs. As with the previous regression, the model performs well, with an R^2 of 0.32 and correctly predicting 82 per cent of the cases. Once we control for other variables, most of the variables have little impact and the effect of only one variable remains statistically significant: previous rebellion.⁷⁶

TABLE NINE ABOUT HERE

This exploratory analysis is fairly crude, but it does reveal several useful lines of inquiry. First, the sex of the MP does appear to have had some impact on their behaviour. Women Labour backbenchers were less likely to have rebelled and voted against war than their male counterparts. The effect of sex does not always achieve statistical significance in the multivariate models, but it is always a consistent effect and sporadically statistically significant. This tallies with experience from the 1997 Parliament – when the new Labour women were found to be less likely to rebel – but against expectations that might have been derived from arguments about the substantive representation of women.⁷⁷ Second, given the crudeness of our variable measuring the ethnicity of a constituency, it is remarkable that it appears (albeit only in February's vote) to have played any role in affecting MPs. It seems likely that a more sophisticated measure of ethnicity, which measured religion rather than colour, would be likely to generate findings of even greater interest.

Third, the importance of the EDM demonstrates that, whatever else EDMs are, they are not meaningless pieces of parliamentary graffiti. In other cases – both before and after Iraq – Governments have been able to bargain with EDM signatories, offering them concessions in order to prevent them converting their voice protest into a vote protest. Over Iraq, this was not possible, and so the EDM proved a remarkably good – though not perfect – indicator of rebellion.

And fourth, and perhaps most importantly, the importance of past behaviour reiterates the extent to which the rebellions over Iraq were the product of an increasingly rebellious parliamentary party. Had there not already been so many rebellions – producing so many rebels – before Iraq, then it is extremely likely that the Iraq revolts would not have been so large. In turn, this also demonstrates one of the problems for the Government, post-Iraq.

The aftermath

The optimistic predictions of one Labour whip after March's rebellion that 'once CNN start beaming up the pictures of Saddam's torture chambers and the stockpiles of chemical weapons that he claims he does not have, you won't be

able to find anyone who remembers voting against Tony Blair' was not to come true.⁷⁸ The issue did not go away – and the after-effects remain today.

During the war itself Labour discontent was subdued. Only two Labour MPs spoke out in vociferous terms. George Galloway allegedly incited foreign forces to rise up against British forces on Abu Dhabi television on 28 March, comments that led to his suspension from the party on 6 May, and his expulsion by Labour's National Constitutional Committee on 23 October. Tam Dalyell flirted with a similar fate when he wrote that Blair should be 'branded as a war criminal and sent to The Hague'.⁷⁹ But although less vociferous, anti-war Labour MPs were not entirely silent on the conduct of the war. Sixty-two Labour MPs signed Austin Mitchell's EDM 1019 calling for a ban on the use of cluster bombs and 65 signed Peter Kilfoyle's EDM 1112, calling on the Government to publish all the available evidence to prove that Parliament had not been misled over claims about Iraq's 'alleged possession of, and intention to use, weapons of mass destruction'.

A further four backbench rebellions occurred over Iraq, but all of them were small. On 4 June 2003, a Liberal Democrat Opposition Day motion calling for an independent inquiry into the handling of intelligence weapons of mass destruction, attracted eleven Labour rebels, while a Conservative Opposition Day motion on 16 July, also demanding a full independent inquiry yielded eight. On 10 September 2003, another Liberal Democrat motion - this time dealing with the role of the United Nations in Iraq - was supported by only one Labour MP and on 9 March 2004, four Labour MPs supported an Opposition Day motion, co-sponsored by Plaid Cymru and the SNP that all advice prepared by the Attorney General on the legality of the war in Iraq should be published.

But the real damaging impact of the Iraq votes came in the Government's relationship with the PLP over other issues. The difference was as much qualitative as quantitative. Iraq did make a big difference to the number of MPs on the backbenches who had rebelled. By the end of the 2003 session, a total of 197 Labour MPs had voted against their whips at least once. Of these almost a quarter, 47, had done so for the first time over Iraq. But most of these MPs have not since gone on to rebel over other issues. The majority of MPs who cast their first dissenting vote over Iraq have not cast any more votes against the Government. Iraq also raised the bar for the forthcoming revolts – such as those over foundation hospitals and top-up fees. After two rebellions of over 100, any rebellions of, say, 40 would suddenly look pretty feeble. But the real problem is more qualitative. As one concerned minister put it immediately after the big Iraq rebellion in March 2003:

We're not only facing the danger that Iraq will give some MPs a rebellion habit, it's also that they are not giving us the benefit of the doubt anymore. People are asking us questions about where quite ordinary policies are going as if we have a hidden agenda.⁸⁰

On 9 July 2003, Blair stressed the need for unity, when he told a weekly meeting of the PLP not to let party indiscipline destroy the Party's chances of a historic third term in power, adding that 'we are better at putting ourselves out of office than the Tories'.⁸¹ It was an argument he had used in his famous Church House speech on taking office in 1997. But somehow, the arguments deployed at the beginning of the 1997 Parliament no longer wash with the more confident PLP, many of whom were elected for a second time in 2001. While the prospect of an approaching election (and the reality of a more credible Official Opposition led by Michael Howard) may create a temporary unity, the Iraq episode demonstrated that Blair isn't going to have everything his own way ever again.

1. The Early Iraq votes

NAME	Date of rebellion		
	24.9.02	25.11.02	22.1.03
Diane Abbott	•	•	•
Harold Best	•	•	•
Harry Cohen	•	•	•
Jeremy Corbyn	•	•	•
Tam Dalyell	•	•	•
Paul Flynn	•	•	•
Kelvin Hopkins	•	•	•
Glenda Jackson	•	•	•
Dr Lynne Jones	•	•	•
Terry Lewis	•	•	•
Alice Mahon	•	•	•
Bob Marshall-Andrews	•	•	•
John McDonnell	•	•	•
Brian Sedgemore	•	•	•
Alan Simpson	•	•	•
Dennis Skinner	•	•	•
Llew Smith	•	•	•
Robert Wareing	•	•	•
Mike Wood	•	•	•
David Drew	•	•	-
Neil Gerrard	•	•	-
Dr Ian Gibson	•	•	-
Christine McCafferty	•	•	-
Mohammad Sarwar	•	•	-
Dr Desmond Turner	•	•	-
John Austin	•	-	•
Harry Barnes	•	-	•
Andrew Bennett	•	-	•
Roger Berry	•	-	•
Ronnie Campbell	•	-	•
John Cryer	•	-	•
Ann Cryer	•	-	•
George Galloway	•	-	•
<i>David Hamilton</i>	•	-	•
Jim Marshall	•	-	•
Julie Morgan	•	-	•
Linda Perham	•	-	•
David Taylor	•	-	•
Betty Williams	•	-	•
Tony Banks	•	-	-
Karen Buck	•	-	-
Iain Coleman	•	-	-
Michael Connarty	•	-	-
Tom Cox	•	-	-
Fabian Hamilton	•	-	-
Jon Owen Jones	•	-	-
<i>Iain Luke</i>	•	-	-
John Lyons	•	-	-
Tony McWalter	•	-	-
Kerry Pollard	•	-	-
Gordon Prentice	•	-	-
Malcolm Savidge	•	-	-
Debra Shipley	•	-	-
Jon Trickett	•	-	-
Paul Truswell	•	-	-
Joan Walley	•	-	-
Mark Fisher	-	•	•
Jim Cousins	-	•	-
Patrick Hall	-	•	-
Peter Kilfoyle	-	•	-
David Lepper	-	•	-
Richard Burden	-	-	•

Michael Clapham	-	-	•
Tony Clarke	-	-	•
Bill Etherington	-	-	•
Hywel Francis	-	-	•
Diana Organ	-	-	•
Albert Owen	-	-	•
Phil Sawford	-	-	•
Marsha Singh	-	-	•
Dr Rudi Vis	-	-	•

Note: bold indicates MPs casting their first votes against the Government; italics indicates members of the 2001 intake.

2. Iraq rebels: 26 February 2004

<i>Rebelled in previous Iraq votes</i>	<i>Signed Iraq EDMs but not rebelled</i>	<i>Not rebelled not signed Iraq EDMs</i>
Diane Abbott	<i>John Battle</i>	Graham Allen
John Austin	<i>Anne Begg</i>	Joe Benton
Tony Banks	Martin Caton	Denzil Davies
Harry Barnes	Colin Challen	Hilton Dawson
Andrew Bennett	David Chaytor	Frank Dobson
Roger Berry	<i>Helen Clark</i>	<i>Frank Doran</i>
Harold Best	Tom Clarke	<i>Paul Farrelly</i>
Karen Buck	<i>Jim Cunningham</i>	Kate Hoey
Richard Burden	Valerie Davey	Jimmy Hood
Ronnie Campbell	Terry Davis	<i>Martyn Jones</i>
Michael Clapham	Jim Dobbin	Tony Lloyd
Tony Clarke	Brian Donohoe	<i>Chris Mole</i>
Harry Cohen	<i>Huw Edwards</i>	<i>Paul Stinchcombe</i>
Iain Coleman	<i>Jeff Ennis</i>	<i>Bill Tynan</i>
Jeremy Corbyn	<i>Roger Godsiff</i>	Alan Williams
Jim Cousins	Doug Henderson	Dr Tony Wright
Tom Cox	David Hinchliffe	
John Cryer	Dr Brian Iddon	
Ann Cryer	Eric Illsley	
Tam Dalyell	<i>Helen Jackson</i>	
David Drew	<i>Mark Lazarowicz</i>	
Mark Fisher	<i>Khalid Mahmood</i>	
Paul Flynn	David Marshall	
Hywel Francis	<i>Ann McKechin</i>	
George Galloway	Kevin McNamara	
Neil Gerrard	Denis Murphy	
Dr Ian Gibson	Dr Doug Naysmith	
Patrick Hall	<i>Peter Pike</i>	
David Hamilton	<i>Joan Ruddock</i>	
Fabian Hamilton	Martin Salter	
Kelvin Hopkins	Chris Smith	
Glenda Jackson	George Stevenson	
Dr Lynne Jones	Dr Gavin Strang	
Jon Owen Jones	<i>Brian White</i>	
Peter Kilfoyle	Tony Worthington	
David Lepper	Derek Wyatt	
Terry Lewis		
Iain Luke		
John Lyons		
Alice Mahon		
Robert Marshall-Andrews		
Jim Marshall		
Christine McCafferty		
John McDonnell		
Tony McWalter		
Julie Morgan		
Diana Organ		
Albert Owen		
Linda Perham		
Kerry Pollard		
Gordon Prentice		
Mohammad Sarwar		
Malcolm Savidge		
Phil Sawford		
Brian Sedgemore		
Debra Shipley		
Alan Simpson		
Marsha Singh		
Dennis Skinner		
Llew Smith		
David Taylor		
Jon Trickett		
Paul Truswell		

Dr Desmond Turner		
Dr Rudi Vis		
Joan Walley		
Robert Wareing		
Betty Williams		
Mike Wood		

Note: Bold indicates an MP who also rebelled against the Government's motion; italics indicate an MP rebelling for the first time against the Government.

3. March's New Rebels

<i>Rebelled in pre-February Iraq votes</i>	<i>Not rebelled nor signed Iraq EDM</i>	<i>Signed Iraq EDMs but not rebelled</i>
Bill Etherington	<i>Bob Blizzard</i>	<i>Kevin Brennan</i>
Michael Connarty	<i>Keith Bradley</i>	Frank Cook
	<i>Anne Campbell</i>	Ian Davidson
	<i>Robin Cook</i>	Clive Efford
	<i>David Crausby</i>	<i>Stephen Hepburn</i>
	<i>John Denham</i>	<i>David Heyes</i>
	<i>Parmjit Dhanda</i>	<i>Joan Humble</i>
	<i>Win Griffiths</i>	<i>Ian Lucas</i>
	<i>John Grogan</i>	<i>Eddie O'Hara</i>
	<i>Dai Havard</i>	Gwyn Prosser
	<i>David Kidney</i>	<i>David Wright</i>
	<i>Eric Martlew</i>	
	<i>Chris Mullin</i>	
	<i>Ken Purchase</i>	
	<i>John Robertson</i>	
	<i>Graham Stringer</i>	
	<i>Dr Alan Whitehead</i>	

Note: Italics indicate an MP casting a dissenting vote against the Government for the first time.

4. The main Iraq rebellions, bivariate analysis of non-categoric variables.

	<i>Not rebelled</i>	<i>Rebelled</i>	<i>Sig</i>
Age	53	56	*
Parliamentary experience	11	11	
% majority	26.9	27.8	
% non-white electorate	6.7	7.9	

5. The main Iraq rebellions, bivariate analysis of non-categoric variables.

	<i>% Not rebelled</i>	<i>% Rebelled</i>	<i>Sig</i>
<i>Sex</i>			*
Men	43	57	
Women	60	40	
<i>Race</i>			
White	46	54	
Non-White	44	56	
<i>Career Status</i>			
Ex-minister	51	49	
Not entered gvt	45	55	
<i>Previous rebellion</i>			***
Rebelled before	23	77	
Not rebelled before	71	29	
<i>Nation</i>			
England	47	53	
Scotland	45	55	
Wales	39	62	
<i>Attitudes</i>			***
Signed EDM	19	81	
Not signed EDM	76	24	

6. Logistic regression, Iraq rebellion

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>
	B	B
Age	0.02	-0.02
Experience	-0.06 *	-0.01
Race	0.09	0.29
Sex	-0.70	-1.32 *
% majority	0.00	0.00
% non-white	0.03	0.01
Nation	-0.58	-1.01
Ex-minister	0.11	0.93
Signed anti-war EDM	-	3.03 ***
Rebelled before	2.50 ***	2.01 ***
Constant	-1.15	-0.33
% correctly predicted	76	82
Nagelkerke R ²	0.37	0.59
N	229	229

7 Bivariate analysis non-categoric variables, EDM signatories

	<i>Not rebelled</i>	<i>Rebelled</i>	<i>Sig</i>
Age	53	56	*
Parliamentary experience	7	11	*
% majority	20	28	*
% non-white electorate	9	8	

8 Bivariate analysis, categoric variables, EDM signatories

	<i>% Not rebelled</i>	<i>% Rebelled</i>	<i>Sig</i>
<i>Sex</i>			*
Men	16	84	
Women	36	64	
<i>Race</i>			
White	20	80	
Non-White	33	67	
<i>Career Status</i>			
Ex-minister	15	85	
Not entered gvt	21	79	
<i>Previous rebellion</i>			***
Rebelled before	10	90	
Not rebelled before	72	28	
<i>Nation</i>			
England	20	80	
Scotland	16	74	
Wales	18	92	

9 Logistic regression, EDM signatories

	B
Age	0.03
Experience	0.00
Race	-1.03
Sex	-0.99
% majority	0.03
% non-white	0.01
Nation	-1.41
Ex-minister	0.46
Rebelled before	1.99 ***
Constant	-0.56
% correctly predicted	83
Nagelkerke R ²	0.32
N	123

Appendix 1: The 139 Rebels

1.	Diane Abbott	48.	Clive Efford	95.	Tony McWalter
2.	Graham Allen	49.	Bill Etherington	96.	Julie Morgan
3.	John Austin	50.	Mark Fisher	97.	Chris Mullin
4.	Tony Banks	51.	Paul Flynn	98.	Denis Murphy
5.	Harry Barnes	52.	Hywel Francis	99.	Dr Doug Naysmith
6.	John Battle	53.	George Galloway	100.	Eddie O'Hara
7.	Andrew Bennett	54.	Neil Gerrard	101.	Diana Organ
8.	Joe Benton	55.	Ian Gibson	102.	Albert Owen
9.	Roger Berry	56.	Roger Godsiff	103.	Linda Perham
10.	Harold Best	57.	Win Griffiths	104.	Peter Pike
11.	Bob Blizzard	58.	John Grogan	105.	Kerry Pollard
12.	Keith Bradley	59.	Patrick Hall	106.	Gordon Prentice
13.	Kevin Brennan	60.	David Hamilton	107.	Gwyn Prosser
14.	Helen Brinton	61.	Fabian Hamilton	108.	Ken Purchase
15.	Karen Buck	62.	Dai Havard	109.	John Robertson
16.	Richard Burden	63.	Doug Henderson	110.	Joan Ruddock
17.	Ronnie Campbell	64.	Stephen Hepburn	111.	Martin Salter
18.	Anne Campbell	65.	David Heyes	112.	Mohammad Sarwar
19.	Martin Caton	66.	David Hinchliffe	113.	Malcolm Savidge
20.	David Chaytor	67.	Kate Hoey	114.	Phil Sawford
21.	Michael Clapham	68.	Jimmy Hood	115.	Brian Sedgemore
22.	Tony Clarke	69.	Kelvin Hopkins	116.	Debra Shipley
23.	Tom Clarke	70.	Joan Humble	117.	Alan Simpson
24.	Harry Cohen	71.	Dr Brian Iddon	118.	Marsha Singh
25.	Iain Coleman	72.	Eric Illsley	119.	Llew Smith
26.	Michael Connarty	73.	Glenda Jackson	120.	Chris Smith
27.	Robin Cook	74.	Helen Jackson	121.	George Stevenson
28.	Frank Cook	75.	Jon Owen Jones	122.	Gavin Strang
29.	Jeremy Corbyn	76.	Lynne Jones	123.	Graham Stringer
30.	Jim Cousins	77.	Martyn Jones	124.	David Taylor
31.	Tom Cox	78.	David Kidney	125.	Jon Trickett
32.	David Crausby	79.	Peter Kilfoyle	126.	Paul Truswell
33.	John Cryer	80.	Mark Lazarowicz	127.	Desmond Turner
34.	Ann Cryer	81.	David Lepper	128.	Bill Tynan
35.	Tam Dalyell	82.	Terry Lewis	129.	Rudi Vis
36.	Valerie Davey	83.	Tony Lloyd	130.	Joan Walley
37.	Ian Davidson	84.	Ian Lucas	131.	Robert Wareing
38.	Denzil Davies	85.	Iain Luke	132.	Alan Whitehead
39.	Terry Davis	86.	John Lyons	133.	Betty Williams
40.	Hilton Dawson	87.	Alice Mahon	134.	Alan Williams
41.	John Denham	88.	B. Marshall-Andrews	135.	Mike Wood
42.	Parmjit Dhanda	89.	Jim Marshall	136.	Tony Worthington
43.	Jim Dobbin	90.	Eric Martlew	137.	Dr Tony Wright
44.	Frank Dobson	91.	Christine McCafferty	138.	David Wright
45.	Frank Doran	92.	John McDonnell	139.	Derek Wyatt
46.	David Drew	93.	Ann McKechin		
47.	Huw Edwards	94.	Kevin McNamara		

Note: bold indicates an MP who voted against the main Government motion

Appendix 2: Analysis of February's rebellion

This appendix repeats both the bivariate and multivariate analysis described above for the voting on Chris Smith's amendment in February 2003.

A2.1 Bivariate analysis non-categoric variables, February

	<i>Not rebelled</i>	<i>Rebelled</i>	<i>Sig</i>
Age	53	56	**
Parliamentary experience	10	12	
% majority	28	27	
% non-white electorate	6	9	*

A2.2 Bivariate analysis, categoric variables, February

	<i>% Not rebelled</i>	<i>% Rebelled</i>	<i>Sig</i>
<i>Sex</i>			
Men	53	47	
Women	62	38	
<i>Race</i>			
White	55	45	
Non-White	56	44	
<i>Career Status</i>			
Ex-minister	60	40	
Not entered gvt	53	47	
<i>Previous rebellion</i>			***
Rebelled before	84	16	
Not rebelled before	30	70	
<i>Nation</i>			
England	55	45	
Scotland	54	46	
Wales	54	46	
<i>Attitudes</i>			***
Signed EDM	27	73	
Not signed EDM	87	13	

A2.3 Logistic regression, February

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>
	B	B
Age	0.02	-0.00
Experience	-0.03	0.03
Race	-0.55	-0.97
Sex	0.22	-0.57
% majority	-0.01	-0.01
% non-white	0.06 **	0.05 *
Nation	-0.38	-0.82
Ex-minister	-0.13	0.56
Signed anti-war EDM	-	3.04 ***
Rebelled before	2.80 ***	2.26 ***
Constant	-2.46	-2.99
% correctly predicted	78	85
Nagelkerke R ²	0.44	0.62
N	236	236

Appendix 3: Analysis of March's rebellion

This appendix repeats both the bivariate and multivariate analysis described above for the voting on Chris Smith's amendment in March 2003.

A3.1 Bivariate analysis non-categoric variables, March

	<i>Not rebelled</i>	<i>Rebelled</i>	<i>Sig</i>
Age	53	56	
Parliamentary experience	11	12	
% majority	27	28	
% non-white electorate	7	8	

A3.2 Bivariate analysis, categoric variables, March

	<i>% Not rebelled</i>	<i>% Rebelled</i>	<i>Sig</i>
<i>Sex</i>			*
Men	48	52	
Women	62	38	
<i>Race</i>			
White	50	50	
Non-White	56	44	
<i>Career Status</i>			
Ex-minister	52	48	
Not entered gvt	50	50	
<i>Previous rebellion</i>			***
Rebelled before	84	16	
Not rebelled before	28	72	
<i>Nation</i>			
England	52	48	
Scotland	53	48	
Wales	39	62	
<i>Attitudes</i>			***
Signed EDM	25	75	
Not signed EDM	78	22	

A3.3 Logistic regression, March's rebellion

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>
	B	B
Age	0.03	0.00
Experience	-0.06 *	-0.03
Race	-0.32	-0.45
Sex	-0.42	-0.87
% majority	0.00	0.00
% non-white	0.02	0.01
Nation	-0.84	-1.30
Ex-minister	0.26	1.05
Signed anti-war EDM	-	2.57 **
Rebelled before	3.01 ***	2.37 **
Constant	-2.53	-2.18
% correctly predicted	79	83
Nagelkerke R ²	0.45	0.59
N	229	229

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- ¹ Philip Norton, *Dissension in the House of Commons, 1974-1979*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1980, pp. 179-190; Philip Cowley and Philip Norton, 'Rebels and rebellions: Conservative MPs in the 1992 Parliament', *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 1 (1999), p. 93.
- ² See, for example, Iain McLean, 'Irish potatoes, Indian corn, and British politics: interests, ideology, heresthetics, and the Repeal of the Corn Laws', in A. Dobson and J. Stanyer (eds), *Contemporary Political Studies 1998*, Nottingham, PSA, 1998.
- ³ *New Statesman*, 3 March 2003.
- ⁴ There were also significant, if less dramatic and less widely publicized, divisions within the Conservatives. A total of 21 Conservative MPs defied their party whips over the issue, and four Conservative frontbenchers resigned over it.
- ⁵ Fifty-three voted no, along with two tellers for the noes, and – in order to ensure a vote – one Labour backbencher acted as a teller for the ayes.
- ⁶ Robin Cook, *The Point of Departure*, London, Simon and Schuster, 2003, p. 252.
- ⁷ Two Labour MPs – Marsha Singh and Ken Purchase – were incorrectly recorded as having voted twice.
- ⁸ Forty-two Labour MPs voted in the aye lobby, with a further two Labour backbenchers acting as tellers for the noes, in order to ensure a division.
- ⁹ The only exception was Patrick Hall.
- ¹⁰ Twelve signed just EDM 716; 43 signed just EDM 927, and 22 signed both EDMs but had not rebelled.
- ¹¹ Sixty Labour MPs also supported Dr Tony Wright's EDM 733, demanding 'an unequivocal confirmation' that any British military action would require the prior approval by a vote in the House of Commons. All but eight of the 60 had also already rebelled and/or signed another anti-war EDM. With these eight included, therefore, 156 Labour MPs had expressed publicly some anti-war sentiment even before the votes in February and March.
- ¹² Kamal Ahmed, 'Blair's High-Wire Act', *The Observer*, 2 March 2003.
- ¹³ Kamal Ahmed, 'Blair's High-Wire Act', *The Observer*, 2 March 2003.
- ¹⁴ For a fuller exposition of Chris Smith's case against war, see Chris Smith, 'No', 'The Iraq Crisis', *The Independent*, 6 March 2003.
- ¹⁵ Kamal Ahmed, 'Blair's High-Wire Act', *The Observer*, 2 March 2003.
- ¹⁶ This is why the figure is often listed as 122. A few days after the vote, Reed resigned from his position as PPS to Margaret Beckett, the Environment Secretary.
- ¹⁷ The two were Bill Etherington and Michael Connarty., who did not vote.
- ¹⁸ Or 37, if Andy Reed were included.
- ¹⁹ Patrick Wintour, 'Support for revolt across Labour', *The Guardian*, 28 February 2003.
- ²⁰ Sarah Baxter, Jonathon Carr-Brown and Nick Speed, 'Gambling All', *The Sunday Times*, 2 March 2003.
- ²¹ Chris Buckland, 'Order! Order!: Why PM's so calm before desert storm', *News of the World*, 2 March 2003.
- ²² BBC News On-Line, 26 February 2003.
- ²³ Patrick Wintour, 'Support for revolt across Labour', *The Guardian*, 28 February 2003.
- ²⁴ *The Sunday Times*, 9 March 2003.
- ²⁵ Colin Brown, David Wastell, Francis Elliott and Julian Coman, 'This man needs his country', *The Sunday Telegraph*, 9 March 2003.
- ²⁶ As one minister commented: 'Robin sounded like a man preparing to leave Andrew Rawnsley, 'Shockingly, principle is back in fashion', *The Observer*, 16 March 2003.

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- ²⁷ Kamal Ahmed and Gaby Hinsliff, 'Final play in Blair's Diplomatic Gamble', *The Observer*, 16 March 2003.
- ²⁸ Jonathon Carr-Brown, Nick Speed and Eben Black, 'The Eve of War', *The Sunday Times*, 16 March 2003.
- ²⁹ Andrew Rawnsley, 'Shockingly, principle is back in fashion', *The Observer*, 16 March 2003. However, only nine PPSs had indicated publicly that they would resign without a second UN resolution: Russell Brown, Anne Campbell, Michael Jabez Foster, Ivan Henderson, Andy Love, Sandra Osborne, Ken Purchase, Dennis Turner and Tony Wright. Toby Helm, 'Arm-twisting in the tearrooms as Blair tries to curb revolt', *Daily Telegraph*, 18 March 2003.
- ³⁰ Robin Cook, 'Why I had to leave the Cabinet', *The Guardian*, 18 March 2003.
- ³¹ Peter Riddell, 'Prime Minister must show he cares for tiresome MPs', *The Times*, 11 March 2003.
- ³² The six were (with the ministers they served in brackets): Sandra Osborne (Helen Liddell), Anne Campbell (Patricia Hewitt), Bob Blizzard (Nick Brown), Andy Reed (Margaret Beckett), David Kidney (Michael Meacher), and Ken Purchase, who automatically lost his job when his boss Robin Cook, resigned, but let it be known that he would have quit anyway. Tony Wright, parliamentary aide to Ruth Kelly, Financial Secretary to the Treasury, abstained, but was later sacked as a PPS in the June 2003 Government reshuffle. Michael Jabez Foster (Hastings and Rye), PPS to the Attorney-General stepped down from his job but was then reinstated in the subsequent reshuffle.
- ³³ Letter to editor (from the author), *The Daily Telegraph*, 21 March 2003.
- ³⁴ Norton, *Dissension in the House of Commons, 1974-1979*, pp. 58-61.
- ³⁵ See Philip Cowley, *Revolts and Rebellions: Parliamentary Voting Under Blair*, London, Politico's, 2002.
- ³⁶ See Philip Cowley and Mark Stuart, 'In Place of Strife? The PLP in Government, 1997-2001', *Political Studies*, 51 (2003), pp. 315-331, esp. pp. 324-326.
- ³⁷ See Philip Cowley and Mark Stuart, 'When Sheep Bark: The Parliamentary Labour Party, 2001-2003', *British Elections and Parties Review*, 13 (2004), forthcoming.
- ³⁸ HC Debs, 5 February 2002, c. 716. Also, interviews, 2 July 2002, 9 July 2002.
- ³⁹ Interview, 30 March 2004.
- ⁴⁰ Cowley, *Revolts and Rebellions*, pp. 44-46.
- ⁴¹ MP to author. Although see Kamal Ahmed, 'Blair's High-Wire Act', *The Observer*, 2 March 2003.
- ⁴² Interview with the author, 23 March 2004.
- ⁴³ Cowley, *Revolts and Rebellions*, pp. 111-113.
- ⁴⁴ Joe Ashton, 'Letter to the Editor: Why so many Labour MPs rebelled', *The Times*, 1 March 2003.
- ⁴⁵ Roy Hattersley, 'The days of unquestioning obedience are over', *The Observer*, 2 March 2003.
- ⁴⁶ See Philip Cowley, *Revolts and Rebellions: Parliamentary Voting Under Blair*, London, Politico's, 2002, pp. 96-97.
- ⁴⁷ Interview, 13 February 2001.
- ⁴⁸ Anne Perkins, 'Cherie Blair ends taboo by canvassing MPs', *The Guardian*, 19 March 2003.
- ⁴⁹ Interview, 23 March 2004.
- ⁵⁰ Peter Stothard, *30 Days. A Month at the heart of Blair's War*, London, HarperCollins, 2003, p. 88, also pp. 93-95.
- ⁵¹ Andrew Grice and Paul Waugh, 'Thirty dramatic hours that shook Westminster – and put Parliament back at the heart of the nation's affairs', *The Independent*, 19 March 2003; Patrick Wintour, 'A day for whips, knives and arm-twisting', *The Guardian*, 19 March 2003.

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- ⁵² Nicholas Watt, 'Ministers pile pressure on rebels', *The Guardian*, 18 March 2003.
- ⁵³ Toby Helm and Andrew Sparrow, 'Buttered up in the tearoom and a caning in the head's study', *Daily Telegraph*, 19 March 2003.
- ⁵⁴ Interview, 23 March 2004.
- ⁵⁵ Interview, 30 March 2004.
- ⁵⁶ 'WAR DIARY - PVT AUSTIN MITCHELL (GRIMSBY SAPPERS)' (Written at an undisclosed location behind the lines. Subject to military censorship by Brigadier Lazarus Mandelson (Cashiered), recalled to national service from editing the Hartlepool Sycophant) (www.austinmitchell.org).
- ⁵⁷ Paul Waugh, '40 Labour MPs call for Blair to resign', *The Independent*, 12 March 2003.
- ⁵⁸ Peter Riddell, 'Persuasion was never so blunt', *The Times*, 19 March 2003.
- ⁵⁹ Mary Ann Sieghart, 'How Chirac and the Left saved the PM's skin', *The Times*, 14 March 2003.
- ⁶⁰ Toby Helm and George Jones, 'Why Blair the warlord should watch his back', *Daily Telegraph*, 13 March 2003.
- ⁶¹ Interview, 23 March 2004. The MP replied: 'It's about the issue.'
- ⁶² At that Thursday's Cabinet when Tony Blair bid his colleagues 'Good morning', some ministers chorused in the manner of a primary school French class, 'Bonjour, Prime Minister'. Andrew Rawnsley, 'Shockingly, principle is back in fashion', *The Observer*, 16 March 2003.
- ⁶³ Michael White and Ewan MacAskill, 'Straw's problems: the French, the papers and Saddam', *The Guardian*, 14 March 2003.
- ⁶⁴ Editorial, 'Air of Resignation', *The Times*, 18 March 2003.
- ⁶⁵ Randeep Ramesh (ed), *The War We Could Not Stop*, London, Faber and Faber, 2003, p. 50.
- ⁶⁶ Nicholas Watt and Anne Perkins, 'Parliamentary aides split over threat to resign', *The Guardian*, 12 March 2003.
- ⁶⁷ Mary Ann Sieghart, 'How Chirac and the Left saved the PM's skin', *The Times*, 14 March 2003.
- ⁶⁸ Cowley, *Revolts and Rebellions*, pp. 113-114.
- ⁶⁹ See, for example, Fiona Mackay, 'Gender and Political Representation in the UK: The State of the 'Discipline'', *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 6 (2004), esp. 104-106, 108-109.
- ⁷⁰ Mackay, 'Gender and Political Representation in the UK', p. 99.
- ⁷¹ Interview, 23 March 2004, BBC Online, 18 March 2003.
- ⁷² That is, those put forward by Alice Mahon or Douglas Hogg.
- ⁷³ This means that we have also excluded two MPs who rebelled in the March rebellion whilst still in the Government, only to resign afterwards.
- ⁷⁴ However, we ran separate analysis, excluding ethnicity, but including all the Scottish seats, with almost identical results.
- ⁷⁵ The impact of gender gets close, at $p=0.089$, but fails to make the 0.05 cut.
- ⁷⁶ Although, again, the impact of gender was close to statistical significance ($p=0.083$).
- ⁷⁷ See Philip Cowley and Sarah Childs, 'Too Spineless to Rebel? New Labour's Women MPs', *British Journal of Political Science*, 33 (2003), 345-366
- ⁷⁸ Toby Helm and Andrew Sparrow, 'Buttered up in the tearoom and a caning in the head's study', *Daily Telegraph*, 19 March 2003.
- ⁷⁹ Tam Dalyell, 'Blair, the war criminal', *The Guardian*, 27 March 2003.
- ⁸⁰ Tom Baldwin, 'Leader leaves old friends behind', *The Times*, 19 March 2003.
- ⁸¹ Michael White, 'Don't throw away election victory, Blair tells rebels', *The Guardian*, 10 July 2003.